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VICTIM FAULT: Who Are You Really and What
Were You Before?*
A leaky roof in the defendant's skating rink produced puddles of
water on the floor. A patron skated through one of the smaller pud-
dles, fell, and sustained injuries. The plaintiffs suit, based on a strict
liability theory under Louisiana Civil Code article 2322,1 was dismissed
at the trial level where the court found that the plaintiff had assumed
the risk and was contributorily negligent. Finding that the plaintiff
"knew or should have known" of the risk, the court of appeal affirmed!
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs
negligent failure to discover or understand the risk was properly a
matter of contributory negligence rather than assumption of risk,8 but
because the "ruined" building housed a commercial enterprise to which
the plaintiff had paid the price of admission, contributory negligence
was not a defense.. Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981).
In the past, the standard of conduct for persons who operate places
of public business, entertainment, and amusement was well-settled'
and required that the premises be kept in reasonably safe condition
considering the nature of the particular business! An action such as
the one in the present case would have been based upon a showing
of some negligent conduct by the defendant constituting fault under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.6 Recently, however, Louisiana courts
have expanded the theory of strict liability to include a wide range
of persons and things.' Strict liability for the damage caused by per-
* With respect to Humphrey Bogart and the writers of Casablanca.
1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2322: "The owner of a building is answerable for the damage
occasioned by its ruin when this is caused by neglect to repair it or when it is the
result of a vice in its original construction."
2. 387 So. 2d 690. (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
3. See 399 So. 2d at 561 for a discussion of the error in the lower court's holding.
4. However, before the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Cares v. Beauregard,
328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976), different standards of care were owed to invitees, licensees,
and trespassers.
5. Spiers v. Lake Shore Enterprises, Inc., 210 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968);
Robnett v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 187 So. 2d 152 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966). For
a more recent statement of the law, see Alfonso v. Market Facilities of Houston, Inc.,
356 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 1st Cir.), uwrit denied, 357 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1978).
6. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2315 provides in part: "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
7. See, e.g., Fonseca v. Marlin Marine Corp., 410 So. 2d 674 (La. 1981) (a partially
completed barn); Jones v. City of Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980) (a catch basin
cover); Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980) and Marquez v. City Stores,
Inc., 376 So. 2d 810 (La. 1979) (escalators); Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La.
1980) (employees); Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978) (a water heater
on an oil rig, Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975) (rotten trees); Turner v.
Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270'(La. 1975) (children); Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La.
1974) (dogs); Williams v. Hempen, 396 So. 2d 999 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) (a trash dump-
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sons or things in one's custody' is now imposed under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2317, which provides in part that "[w]e are responsible,
not only for the damages occasioned by our own act, but for that which
is caused by the act of persons for whom we are answerable, or of
things which we have in our custody."' Likewise, article 2322 makes
the owner of a building"0 strictly liable to persons injured through
ster); Stablier v. City of Baton Rouge, 393 So. 2d 148 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (a drain
pipe); DeRouen v. Department of Transp. & Dev., 392 So. 2d 765 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1980) (a hole in a bridge); Shipp v. City of Alexandria, 392 So. 2d 1078 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), rev'd, 395 So. 2d 727 (La. 1980) (a pothole in a street); Walker v. Farmland In-
dus., Inc., 392 So. 2d 1099 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (an explosion on a construction site);
South Central Bell Tel. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 385 So. 2d 830 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1980) (leakage in an underground gasoline line); Cordwell v. Jefferson
Rentals Div., 379 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (a chain hoist); Vicknair v. T.L.
James Co., Inc., 375 So. 2d 960 (La. App. 4th.Cir. 1979) (a metal rim lock on a truck
tire); Reinhard v. City of New Orleans, 371 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (a manhole
in a street); Boudin v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarket, 371 So. 2d 370 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1979) (a metal railing at a supermarket); Parker v. South La. Contractors,
Inc., 370 So. 2d 1310 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (a loading ramp); Daniel v. Cambridge.
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979) (an Arabian stallion); Wilson
v. Voss, 361 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) (a defective water heater-liability
for a leased thing was imposed under Civil Code article 2965); American Rd. Ins. Co.
v. Montgomery, 354 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977) (a traffic light); Leaber v. Jolley
Elevator Corp., 354 So. 2d 746 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (elevators).
8. See generally Comment, Does Louisiana Really Have Strict Liability Under Civil
Code Articles 2317, 2318, and 2821?, 40 LA. L. REV. 207 (1979).
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2317 further provides: "This, however is to be understood with
the following modifications." The companion articles which follow serve as modifications.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2318: The father, or after his decease, the mother, are responsible
for the damage occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children, residing with
them, or placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to them recourse
against those persons. The same responsibility attaches to the tutors of minors.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2319: The curators of insane persons are answerable for the
damage occasioned by those under their care.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2320: Masters and employers are answerable for the damage oc-
casioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which
they are employed. Teachers and artisans are answerable for the damages caused by
their scholars or apprentices, while under their superintendence. In the above cases,
responsibility only attaches, when the masters or employers, teachers and artisans,
might have prevented the act which caused the damage and have not done it.
LA. Civ. CODE art. 2321: The owner of an animal is answerable for the damage he
has caused; but if the animal had been lost, or had strayed more than a day, he may
discharge himself from this responsibility, by abandoning him to the person who has
sustained the injury; except where the master has turned loose a dangerous or nox-
ious animal, for then he must pay for all the harm done, without being allowed to
make the abandonment.
LA. CiV. CODE art. 2322: The owner of a building is answerable for the damage occa-
sioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result
of a vice in its original construction.
10. "Building" has not been precisely defined. However, to be considered a
"building," a structure must have some permanence, though it need not be intended
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its "ruin,"" whether due to a vice in its original construction or
through the owner's neglect in failure to repair it."
While the imposition of strict liability under these articles has
undergone a great deal of change in recent years,"3 the essence of
strict liability in Louisiana was summarized by former Justice Tate
in his opinion in Loescher v. Parr."
When harm results from the conduct or defect of a person or thing
which creates an unreasonable risk of. harm to others, a person
legally responsible under these code articles for the supervision,
care, or guardianship of the person or thing may be held liable
for the damage thus caused, despite the fact that no personal
negligent act or inattention on the former's part is proved. The
liability arises from his legal relationship to the person or thing
whose conduct or defect creates an unreasonable risk of injuries
to others.'5
The court's reasoning in Loescher was based on the theory that, as
between two innocent parties, the owner or guardian of a thing should
pay for any damage caused by that thing.' Once a defect which creates
an unreasonable risk of injury to another is shown in the person or
thing causing injury to the plaintiff, and damage is shown to have
for human habitation. Mudd v. Travelers Indem. Co., 309 So. 2d 297 (La. 1975); Cothern
v. LaRocca, 255 La. 673, 232 So. 2d 473 (1970) (a concrete pipe held not to be a building).
See Fonesca v. Marlin Marine Corp., 410 So. 2d 674 (La. 1981) (a forty to sixty percent
completed barn held to be a building); Olsen v. v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La.
1978) (a fixed drilling platform held to be a building): Quintell v. Ferran, 147 La. 153,
84 So. 571 (1920) (a walkway over water to a camphouse held to be a building). See
also Comment, Article 2322 And the Liability of The Owner of An Immovable, 42 TUL.
L. REV. 178, 186 (1967).
11. "Ruin" has not been precisely defined, but it has been held to involve the
actual fall or collapse of a building or a substantial component of a structure. Davis
v. RoyalGlobe Ins. Co., 257 La. 523. 242 So. 2d 839 (La. 1970) ("ruin" held not to in-
clude falling lead-poisoned paint flakes). See Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285
(La. 1978) ("ruin" held to include an exploding hot water heater); Leaber v. Jolly Elevator
Co., 354 So. 2d 746 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) ("ruin" held to include an elevator malfunc-
tion due to the failure of a hydraulic jack casing): Hornsby v. Ray, 327 So. 2d 146
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) ("ruin" held to include rotten floors); Parker v. Brawley, 306
So. 2d 793 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975) ("ruin" held not to include a ruptured water system
in a leased dress shop).
12. Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978).
13. For an excellent discussion of these developments, see Rodrigue v. Dixilyn
Corp., 620 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1980); Andrus, Strict Liability Under Civil Code Articles
2317, 2318, and 2321: An Initial Analysis, 25 LA. B.J. 105 (1977); Note, A Functional
Purpose for Comparing Faults: A Suggestion for Reexamining "Strict Liability," 41 LA.
L. REV. 1374 (1981).
14. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
15. Id. at 446.
16. Id.
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resulted from that defect, liability can be avoided only if the owner
or guardian responsible for the person or thing can show that the
harm was caused by (1) the fault of the victim, (2) the fault of a third
person, or (3) an irresistible force."
"Victim fault"" has been an important defense in Louisiana strict
liability cases and has been discussed in terms of either assumption
of risk"9 or contributory negligence." "Contributory negligence" is con-
duct on the part of the injured plaintiff which falls below the stan-
dard to which he is required to conform for his own protection and
which contributes to the cause of his injury."t On the other hand, where
an injured party, before his injury, takes his chances of injury from
a known risk for which the defendant is responsible, he is said to
have "assumed the risk, ' and has consented to relieving the defen-
dant of an obligation of conduct toward him. The latter defense is
based upon the maxim volenti non fit injuria, which reflects the idea
that no wrong is done to one who consents,u and which is deeply
rooted in Continental jurisprudence and the English common law."
A subjective standard is applied to assumption of risk in determining
whether the plaintiff knows, understands, and appreciates the risk.'
17. Id. at 446-47.
18. This discussion is limited to the "victim fault" defense. For the defense of
"fault of a third person," see Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1979). The
"irresistible force" defense was at issue in Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
19. Assumption of risk has been recognized as a defense to strict liability actions
where the plaintiff knows and understands the risk he is incurring and his choice
is free and voluntary. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133
(1971). See Rodrigue v. Dixilyn Corp., 620 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1980); Khoder v. A.M.F.,
Inc., 359 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1976); Hastings v. Dis Tran Prods.. Inc., 389 F. Supp.
1352 (W.D. La. 1975); Daniel v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins., 368 So. 2d 810 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1979); Tri-State Ins. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 364 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1978); Wilson v. Voss, 361 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Parker v. Hanks, 345
So. 2d 194 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Dixon v. Gutnecht, 339 So. 2d 1285 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1976); Wunstell v. Crochet, 325 So. 2d 727, 731 n.6 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
20. Until the instant case, contributory negligence, in the sense of failing to use
ordinary care for one's own safety, was not recognized as a defense to Louisiana's
strict liability actions. See note 45, infra, and accompanying text, and see cases cited
in note 19, supra. But see Sullivan v. Gulf States Util. Co., 382 So. 2d 184 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1980); Korver v. City of Baton Rouge, 348 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
21. W. PROSSER. LAW OF TORTS S 65, at 416-17 (4th ed. 1971).
22. Id. S 68. at 440.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, S 496A, comment (b) (1965).
24. See Rice, The Automobile Guest and the Rationale of Assumption of Risk, 27
MINN. L. REV. 323, 324 (1943).
25. See Dofflemeyer v. Gilley, 384 So. 2d 435 (La. 1980); McInnis v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 322 So. 2d 155 (La. 1975); Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249
So. 2d 133 (1971); Daniel v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins., 368 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1979); Pollard v. Roberts, 306 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975); RESTATEMENT
NOTES
An objective standard is applied to contributory negligence, and the
plaintiff is required to have the knowledge, understanding, and judg-
ment of the standard reasonable man." One writer has noted the
distinction: "The essence of assumption of risk is twofold: first,
knowledge and appreciation of a danger, and second, a voluntary en-
countering of it ... ; [t]he essence of contributory negligence is simp-
ly carelessness."" In order to assume a risk, one must understand
and appreciate risk involved and knowingly and voluntarily accept
the risk as well as the inherent possibility of danger because of the
risk.' Therefore, when assumption of risk is asserted as a defense,
whether under the circumstances a reasonably prudent man would
or would not have subjected himself to the risk should be irrelevant."
However, under the defense of assumption of risk some Louisiana
courts have imputed to the plaintiffs the knowledge of what a
reasonably prudent person should know, thus barring the plaintiff's
recovery."M The establishment of assumption of risk has been described
as meaning juridically that, "no tort was committed by the defendant
and for that reason the plaintiff's action against him fails."' Thus
assumption of risk might be viewed as the negative of duty; that is,
where the defendant's duty ends, the assumption of risks by the vic-
tim begins.2
Strict liability at common law can be traced to the rule in Rylands
v. Fletcher? that a person who keeps anything on his land that is likely
to do mischief must do so at his peril, as he is answerable for all
(SECOND) OF TORTS S 496A, comment (a) & S 496D, comment (c) (1965); F. BOHLEN. STUDIES
IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) containing Bohlen. Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV.
L. REV. 14, 16-18 (1906) and Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REv. 233,245-56
(1908); Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort Liability-Prelude to
Comparative Fault, 11 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 729 (1980); Comment, Distinction Between
Assumption of Risk and Contributory Negligence in Wisconsin, 1960 Wisc. L. REV. 460.
26. See note 25, supra.
27. Crowe, 7e Anatomy of a Tort, 22 Loy. L. REV. 902, 915 (1976). It may be clearer
to consider the defense as containing three elements: 1) knowledge, 2) appreciation,
and 3) voluntary assumption of a danger.
28. See Mclnnis v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 322 So. 2d 155 (La. 1975); Langlois
v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971); Pollard v. Roberts, 306
So. 2d 801 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
29. See Bohlen, Contributory Negligence. 21 HARV. L. REV. 233, 246 (1908).
30. Bass v. Aetna Ins. Co., 370 So. 2d 511 (La. 1979); Prestenbach v. Sentry Ins.
Co., 340 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1976).
31. F. STONE, TORT DOCTRINE S 51 in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 72 (1977)
(emphasis in original). See Bohlen, supra, note 29, at 247.
32. See Wunstell v. Crochet, 325 So. 2d 727 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). See generally
Symposium: Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REV. 1 (1961). See also Green, Assumed Risk
As A Defense, 22 LA. L. REV. 77 (1961).
33. (18681 L.R. 3 R. & I. App. 330.
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damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.' A showing
of negligence is not considered necessary to establish fault 5 when the
very nature of the article which escapes is such that probability of
damage to others is inherent. 6 This rule does not apply where the
escaping substance is stable or is of a nature which is not likely to
escape and cause harm." The Restatement of Torts,' has accepted the
principle of Rylands v. Fletcher," but has limited it to an "abnormally
dangerous" activity of the defendant. 0
Under the Restatement of Torts, contributory negligence is not a
defense to the strict liability of one who engages in an "abnormally
dangerous" activity.'1 Consistent with that view, Professor Prosser
reported that contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense
in cases of strict liability."2 The rationale being that since the strict
liability for the "abnormally dangerous" activity is not based upon
negligence, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should not be
a defense to his claim.'3 Louisiana courts appear to have adopted this
rule" and its rationale. In Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.,"3 the Loui-
siana Supreme Court denied the use of contributory negligence as
a defense to strict liability by stating that "[tihe defense of con-
tributory negligence which is urged here presupposes original
negligence on the part of the defendant. This case is not a case where
34. See M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF TORTS 291-310 (6th ed. 1896); L. COOLEY, LAW OF
TORTS 678-80 (1888); F. HARPER, THE LAW OF TORTS 788-870 (1956); R. KEETON. LEGAL CAUSE
IN THE LAW OF TORTS 103-17 (1963); W. PROSSER, supra note 21, S 78, at 505; W. PROSSER,
SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 135, 159-77 (1953); Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands
v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REV. 298 (1911).
35. See F. HARPER, supra note 34, at 788-89.
36. See Bohlen, supra note 34, at 423-24.
37. Id. at 424-26.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. SS 519, 520(1977).
39. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 512 (4th ed. 1971).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 519 provides:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
It should be noted that the word "ultrahazardous" formerly appeared where "abnor-
mally dangerous" now appears.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 524 (1977).
42. W. PROSSER, supra note 21, S 79, at 524.
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 524, comment (a) (1977). See also Bohlen,
supra note 29, at 255.
44. See note 20, supra. See also F. STONE, supra note 31, at S 350(v), at 454; Crowe,
The Anatomy of a Tort, 22 Loy. L. REV. 902, 915 (1976).
45. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
NOTES
negligence is an ingredient of fault, and contributory negligence is
not a defense.""6
In the instant case, the plaintiff, aware that several large pud-
dles of water had formed on the floor of the rink, safely skated around
them for approximately an hour. Unaware of a smaller puddle,
however, he skated through it, fell, and was injured. According to
the supreme court, the record did not support the conclusion that the
plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk, but the dismissal of the plain-
tiffs claim would not be reversed if the Loescher "victim fault" defense
to strict liability included ordinary contributory negligence.' Therefore
the first question considered by the court was whether contributory
negligence may be a defense' 8 to a strict liability claim. The court
recognized that contributory negligence should not be a defense" to
strict liability claims based on ultrahazardous activity,w° but stated
that its suggestion in Langlois that contributory negligence may never
be a defense in non-ultrahazardous strict liability cases was
overbroad."
The court observed that the idea of precluding contributory
negligence as an allowable defense in a strict liability action was bor-
rowed from the common law where strict liability involves
unreasonable risks created by abnormal conduct;"2 however, Louisiana
has extended strict liability to include more than abnormal conduct.
Dorry stated that no policy reason exists to deny the defense in cases
where the activity or conduct of the person or thing causing damage
is "apparently innocuous."4 The court. reasoned that where a plain-
tiffs fault contributes to his own damage, that fault should carry more,
not less, consequence where the defendant is less culpable than the
46. 258 La. at 1086. 249 So. 2d at 140.
47. Citing Smolinski v. TauUi, 276 So. 2d 286 (La. 1973), the Dorry court defined
ordinary contributory negligence as "conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls
below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection .... The stan-
dard of conduct to which the plaintiff must conform for his own protection is that
of a reasonable man under the circumstances." 399 So. 2d at 560.
48. The court actually used the word "bar" in place of "defense." 399 So. 2d at 561.
49. Id. at 560.
50. "[Fior an activity to be classified as ultrahazardous two elements must ap-
pear: 1) that harm is a possible consequence even when the activities are conducted
with the greatest care and prudence, and 2) that such possible harm is foreseeable
.... .Graham v. Allied Chem. Corp., 341 So. 2d 1196, 1199 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
51. 399 So. 2d at 560 (referring to 258 La. at 1086, 249 So. 2d at 140).
52. Id. at 560-61.
53. Id. at 560. The court did not define "apparently innocuous" things, activity,
or conduct but cited as examples a pet dog (Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La.
1974)), a bicycle-riding child (Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975)), and a magnolia
tree (Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975)).
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plaintiff and his liability is based on some legal fault other than
negligence.' Specifically, the court stated that where the activity is
neither ultrahazardous nor unnatural to the locality, and produces no
income to the defendant, the defense should be allowed.55 Because the
instant case involved a commercial enterprise to which the plaintiff
had paid the price of admission, contributory negligence was not a
defense. The court in Dorry further stated that the circumstances
where the defense is allowable should be developed on a case by case
basis.
The court continued by distinguishing between the defenses of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence. Since the plaintiff
testified that he did not see the small puddle which caused his fall,
the Dorry court reasoned that he could not have assumed the risk
of anything he had not actually observed.w The supreme court held
that the court of appeal had improperly expanded the risk that Dorry
had knowingly assumed when it found that he "knew or should have
known there was a good possibility that water would be present in
areas other than the area which he avoided while skating."6 In so doing
the supreme court purported to subscribe to the Restatement pro-
vision that "[e]xcept where he expressly so agrees, a plaintiff does
not assume a risk of harm arising from the defendant's conduct unless
he then knows of the existence of the risk and appreciates its
unreasonable character."" According to Dorry, the imputation of
knowledge of the dangerous condition which the plaintiff did not ac-
tually possess is an improper expansion of the risk that the plaintiff
had knowingly assumed. The Dorry court declared that language used
by Louisiana courts 9 incorporating an objective element inherent
54. 399 So. 2d at 560.
55. Id. at 561.
56. Id. The language in Prestenbach v. Sentry Ins. Co., 340 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1976),
which was the basis of the appellate court's error, could have been read differently
to reach the same result as the court in the present case. Prestenbach "'impute[dl
knowledge to a plaintiff, not because he was in a position to make certain observa-
tions, but only when he actually makes those observations, and from them should
reasonably have known that a risk was involved.'" 399 So. 2d at 562 (emphasis add-
ed). It can be argued that Dorry did not actually make an observation of the small
puddle, thus under Prestenbach it would be improper to impute knowledge of that obser-
vation to him. As Dorry pointed out: "Plaintiff knowingly assumed only the risk of
the large puddle he actually observed and successfully avoided." Id. at 561.
57. Id at 561 (quoting Dorry v. LaFleur, 387 So. 2d 690, 692 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980)).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 490D (1977).
59. See, e.g., Bass v. Aetna Ins. Co., 370 So. 2d 511 (La. 1979); Chappius v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978); Prestenbach v. Sentry Ins. Co., 340 So.
2d 1331 (La. 1976).
[Vol. 421400
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in the phrase "should have known" departs from the Usual formula-
tion of the doctrine of assumption of risk.'
The cases which Dorry cites for inspiring the inclusion of the ob-
jective element in the doctrine of assumption of risk were not strict
liability cases." They were negligence cases in which both contributory
negligence and assumption of risk were allowable defenses. In those
cases, distinguishing between the objective determination and the sub-
jective determination was unnecessary because the finding of either
one constituted a defense which would bar the plaintiff's recovery;
the court was required only to find that the plaintiff either knew or
should have known of the risk of harm. Accordingly, similar behavior
has been called contributory negligence,62 assumption of risk," either
contributory negligence or assumption of risk," both contributory
negligence and assumption of risk," and even "contributory negligence
under the assumption of risk doctrine."" This confusion may be due
to an overlapping of the two defenses, much like intersecting circles
sharing a considerable area in common, neither excluding the other.
60. 399 So. 2d at 561. Dorry suggests that the objective notion inherent in the
phrase "should have known," as used in Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So.
2d 926 (La. 1978), was unexplained and probably unintentional dictum. LeBouef v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980), was cited in the instant
case for noting that the objective element in Chappuis was a departure from the tradi-
tional formulation of voluntary assumption of the risk and was in no way indicative
of an intention by the Louisiana Supreme Court to expand available defenses to in-
clude all forms of contributory negligence.
61. Bass v. Aetna Ins. Co., 320 So. 2d 511 (La. 1979); Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978); Prestenbach v. Sentry Ins. Co., 340 So. 2d 1331 (La.
1976).
62. See, e.g., Magee v. McCree, 278 So. 2d 587 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Lutrell
v. Beard, 273 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Brown v. Collins, 223 So. 2d 453
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
63. See, e.g., Prestenbach v. Sehtry Ins. Co., 340 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1976); Powell
v. Heck, 378 So. 2d 582 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Evans v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 291 So. 2d 865 (L. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Berry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 273 So.
2d 923 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Freeman v. New York Fidelity & Cas. Co., 224 So.
2d 557 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
64. See, e.g., Free v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 380 So. 2d 70 (La. 1979); McIntyre v. Poole, 293 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974); Lemmon v. Babb, 219 So. 2d 272 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Rollier v. Cormier,
192 So. 2d 568 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 250 La. 256, 195 So. 2d 142 (1967).
65. See, e.g., Gruber v. Beeson, 284 So. 2d 820 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Cormier
v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 279 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Bensel v. Trosclair,
250 So. 2d 502 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Church v. Allstate Ins. Co., 242 So. 2d 646
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Duhe v. Cali, 236 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
66. Irvin v. Savelle, 325 So. 2d 866, 870 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
67. W. PROSSER, supra note 21. at S 68, at 441.
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The supreme court's reasoning in the instant case regarding
assumption of risk was based primarily on two points: 1) the plain-
tiffs testimony that he did not know of the presence of the smaller
puddle and 2) the lower court's failure to find that knowledge. But
Dorry points out that the plaintiffs own testimony is not necessarily
conclusive as to his knowledge of the condition. Comment (d), which
follows the above section of the Restatement," is cited as the basis
for the supreme court's statement that "there are some risks that
every man must be held to appreciate.""' Comment (d) provides in
part: "There are some risks as to which no adult will be believed
if he says that he did not know or understand them."7 However, the
Dorry court added to the Restatement, stating that there is a plain
difference between what one "must have known" (a finding of actual
knowledge) and what one "should have known" (the imposition of an
objective standard of care)." The phrase "must have known" is used
in the supreme court's explanation of section 496D, comment (d), yet
no such words appear in that section or its comments. The word
"must" seems to be an invention of the present court-even so, "must
have known" is a logical extension of comment (d), which explains that
adults surely are aware that fire burns, water drowns, and objects
fall from heights. A finding that the plaintiff must have known
(described by Dorry as a finding of actual knowledge) amounts to a
finding that the plaintiff actually knew, and he will not be believed
if he says otherwise.
Moreover, the court appears to mix what should be two separate
elements of assumption of risk: knowledge on the one hand and ap-
preciation on the other. Speaking in terms of what every man must
be held to appreciate, the court then distinguished between what one
must have known and what one should have known. Comment (d) in-
cludes more than just knowledge in rejecting a plaintiffs testimony
as conclusive; it covers "what he knew, understood, or appreciated."2
The mixture of the words "appreciate," "knowledge," and "aware""
in the court's discussion indicates that the court may consider
knowledge and appreciation of a danger as a single element of assump-
tion of risk. A finding of knowledge, however, falls short of finding
a proper appreciation of a danger. This author submits that the
defense should contain three distinct elements: 1) knowledge of the
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 496D, comment (d) (1965).
69. 399 So. 2d at 563.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, S 496D, comment (d) (1965). See W. PROSSER,
supra note 21, S 68, at 448.
71. 399 So. 2d at 563.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 496D, comment (d) (1965).
73. 399 So. 2d at 563.
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condition, 2) appreciation of its dangerous quality, and 3) voluntary
assumption thereof."
Assuming that the Dorry invention of "must" is acceptable, a prob-
lem may arise in distinguishing between what one "must" know and
what one "should" know. Proof of the actual knowledge of the plain-
tiff seems limited to the plaintiffs admissions or to circumstantial
evidence. Assuming that the Restatement examples given in comment
(d) fall into the Dorry category of what a plaintiff "must" know, such
conduct would constitute assumption of risk without any further
evidence. Nevertheless, a finding of what the plaintiff "must have
known" markedly resembles a finding of what the plaintiff "should
have known."
A narrow line indeed distinguishes one case in which a man testi-
fying that he did not know fire burns is told by the court that he
"must have known" (or more properly that the court will not believe
he did not know) from another case in which the same man is told
he either "knew or should have known" that fire burns. Regardless
of how fine the line appears to be drawn, the word "should" seems
to allow an absence of knowledge; that is, the plaintiff did not actually
know, but he "should have known." Once the law imputes such
knowledge to him, the defense becomes a matter of contributory
negligence, not assumption of risk.
By eliminating from the defense of assumption of risk those cir-
cumstances where the plaintiff "knew or should have known" of a
particular risk of harm, the defense is substantially narrowed. The
fact that the defense is more restrictive will have little impact in strict
liability cases where the defense of contributory negligence now may
be allowed,75 because the plaintiffs failure to know that which he
"should have known" will be considered as contributory negligence.
However, in strict liability cases where the defendant is precluded
from asserting the defense of contributory negligence, any defense
based on what the plaintiff "should have known" is lost, and the only
remaining defense turns on the showing of the plaintiff's actual and
subjective knowledge of a risk and his assumption thereof."0
Arguably, because contributory negligence has not been an
74. See text at note 27, supra.
75. This argument is based on the Dorry suggestion that contributory negligence
will be an allowable defense in some strict liability cases.
76. In Prestenbach v. Sentry Ins. Co., 340 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1976), the court's deci-
sion did not depend on a finding of actual knowledge. The plaintiff's action would have
been barred under a finding of either assumption of risk or contributory negligence.
Therefore the question. of whether the plaintiffs decedent "knew" or only "should
have known" that the driver of the automobile was intoxicated was not determinative.
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allowable defense to cases in strict liability, courts may have been
prone to extend the defense of assumption of risk in some cir-
cumstances to include what was properly a matter of contributory
negligence in order to allow the defendant to escape liability. To
achieve this equitable result, the objective "should have known" ele-
ment was by necessity included in the only allowable victim fault
defense -assumption of risk. Likewise, where a trier of fact chose
to disbelieve the testimony of a plaintiff, rather than bluntly to
challenge the injured party's testimony that he did not know of the
danger, a tempting alternative was to say simply and diplomatically
that the plaintiff "knew or should have known."
The determination of what is meant by the risk is very impor-
tant; a plaintiff is not allowed to recover when he is found to have
voluntarily assumed the risk of injury." The supreme court in the
present case stated that the plaintiff knowingly assumed only the risk
of the large puddle he actually had observed and not the smaller pud-
dle he had not seen. In his dissent, Justice Marcus imputed
knowledge"8 of a dangerous rink to the plaintiff because he observed
and avoided the larger puddles of water, and found that by continu-
ing to skate, the plaintiff "voluntarily and knowingly exposed himself
to any risks resulting from skating in the rink."'' The majority view
narrowed the risk to the risk of injury caused by larger puddles of
water, while the dissent viewed the risk to be the risk of injury caused
by a dangerous rink.
Characterizing the risk to be the risk of injury caused by a
dangerous rink really makes any imputation of knowledge to the plain..
tiff unnecessary. The plaintiff was aware of the large puddles and
skated around them. The injury or harm which resulted to the plain..
tiff's elbow, wrist, and arm was caused by falling. The risk of harm,
therefore, was the risk of falling. This analysis is illustrated in the
following situation. When a guest passenger voluntarily rides with
an intoxicated automobile driver, he assumes the risk of an accident
which may result from the driver's intoxication"'- he is in fact con-
senting to a dangerous situation." The risk of harm is the risk of
77. See note 25, supra.
78. "I consider that from these observations, plaintiff should have known that
the risk was dangerous due to puddles on the floor caused by a defective roof." 399
So. 2d at 563 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. See Freeman v. New York Fidelity & Cas. Co., 224 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1969). However, such conduct has not always been called assumption of risk. See
notes 61-64, supra.
81. "A passenger riding with a driver who has been drinking excessively only
assumes the risk of drunk driving, that is, of accidents resulting from the drunk driv-
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collision. Thus, such a passenger, if injured, could not complain that
he had assumed the risk of colliding with some obstacles but not
others. By analogy, Dorry can be said to have assumed the risk of
a fall resulting from a dangerous situation caused by the defect in
the defendant's leaky roof. Following this reasoning, the record in the
present case supports a finding of assumption of risk and as such,
the lower court's decision should have been affirmed and the plain-
tiff's claim dismissed.
The court in Dorry stated that contributory negligence should be
a defense for strictly liable defendants where the defendant's activ-
ity is "apparently innocuous" and produces no income to him. Since
the defendant's activity here was income producing, the supreme court
did not allow contributory negligence to be a defense in the present
case. Therefore, the court's suggestion that contributory negligence
may be a defense in certain strict liability cases is dictum.' However,
if this dictum is adopted, the distinction between "ultrahazardous"
activity and "apparently innocuous" activity will become important.
Under such a categorization, Louisiana strict liability laws for
ultrahazardous activity are consistent with the common law concept
of the same.' While "innocuous" activities will remain within the codal
scheme. governing the liability for things, the use of contributory
negligence as a defense will place these activities closer to the com-
mon law negligence action."
If the dictum in Do'ry is followed," the Loescher defense of vic-
tim fault will be broadened considerably by the inclusion of con-
tributory negligence. Such an evolution of the victim fault defense
is quite consistent with Loescher's underlying theory for allowing the
imposition of strict liability," which is that as between two innocent
parties, the owner or guardian of a thing should pay for any damage
caused by that thing.' Arguably, he who is contributorily negligent
is not an innocent party within the meaning of Loescher. That is, the
ing." Marcotte v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 La. 989, 993, 249 So. 2d 105, 107 (1971). See
Irvin v. Savelle, 325 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
82. However, the court stated that "Ithe threshold issue posed by this appeal,
therefore, is whether the 'victim fault' indicated in Loescher v. Parr as a defense in
a strict liability case, may include ordinary contributory negligence." 399 So. 2d at
560 (citation omitted).
83. See notes 41 & 42, supra.
84. See note 43, supra.
85. Dorry v. LaFleur was cited for deciding the question of whether contributory
negligence can serve as a defense in a strict liability case in Morgan v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indemnity Co., 402 So. 2d 640 (La. 1981).
86. See note 92, infra.
87. 324 So. 2d at 446. See note 92, infra.
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plaintiff's contributory negligence constitutes "victim fault.""u This
argument is strengthened with Professor Prosser's suggestion that
such conduct be termed "contributory fault" rather than "contributory
negligence."89
The reasoning of Justice ad hoc Fedoroff on this point is succinct
and sound. He wrote:
Where a plaintiffs negligence contributes to his own damage, there
is no reason to ignore his fault in every case simply because the
defendant's liability is based on some legal fault other than
negligence. Quite to the contrary, the plaintiff's negligence should
carry more, not less, consequence when the defendant is strictly
liable, but less culpable than the plaintiff.'
This rationale is the key in allowing contributory negligence in cer-
tain strict liability cases.' A negligent defendant whose conduct has
fallen below the standard set by law is permitted to raise as a defense
conduct on the part of the plaintiff which contributed to his own in-
jury. It follows that a non-negligent defendant, should, a fortiori, be
allowed to raise the same defense. First, the defendant with legally
imposed fault is less culpable than the negligent defendant and should
88. See Sullivan v. Gulf States Util. Co., 382 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980);
Korver v. City of Baton Rouge, 348 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
89. It is perhaps unfortunate that. contributory negligence is called negligence at
all. "Contributory fault" would be a more descriptive term. Negligence as it is
commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others.
Contributory negligence is conduct which involves an undue risk of harm to the
actor himself. Negligence requires a duty, an obligation of conduct to another
person. Contributory negligence involves no duty, unless we are to be so ingenious
as to say that the plaintiff is under an obligation to protect the defendant against
liability for the consequences of his own negligence.
W. PROSSER. supra note 21, at S 65, at 418 (footnotes omitted).
90. 399 So. 2d at 560.
91. In Sullivan v. Gulf States Util. Co., 382 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 1st Cir: 1980),
a case based on the strict liability provisions of article 2317, the first circuit wrote:
It would be ironic in this case for the defendant to be able to escape liability
in a negligence action because of the plaintiffs contributory negligence, yet be
held liable under a strict liability theory when the plaintiff has been equally at
fault in bringing about the harm. We think the policy reasons in Loescher v. Parr
point away from such an ironic result. Loescher was based on the proposition that
out of two innocent parties, the owner or guardian of a thing should pay for any
damage caused by that thing. We do not have two innocent parties in this case,
as the word innocent is understood in strict liability law.
Id. at 189-90. In Sullivan, the plaintiffs contributory negligence amounted to "victim
fault." See Parker v. Hanks, 345 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), where the third
circuit saw "no harm" in designating fault of the victim as contributory negligence.
However, Parker noted that the question of whether strict liability "victim fault" was
the same as contributory negligence in negligence cases "remains to be fully developed"
and is a concept which should be "worked out more precisely .... " Id. at 199.
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receive the same, if not more, benefit for his innocence. Second, the
plaintiff who has contributed to his own injury is more culpable than
the defendant with legally imposed responsibility.
Clearly, the things or conduct which Dorry considered "in-
nocuous" -such as pet dogs," a bicycle-riding child," and a magnolia
tree,"-do not involve a type of dangerous activity, such as the use
of explosives, which society should discourage so vehemently.
Therefore, inasmuch as liability for these activities already serves to
discourage them to some extent, strictly liable defendants engaged
in "innocuous" activities should be allowed to assert the defense of
contributory negligence as a matter of public policy.
Dorry does not purport to change the present rule that con-
tributory negligence should not be a defense where the defendant's
activity is ultrahazardous. Nor does the defense apply to activities
which are not ultrahazardous, but which produce income to the defen-
dant. The emphasis placed on the distinctions between "ultrahazar-
dous" and "innocuous" activities suggests the establishment of only
these two categories. As such, the income producing skating rink, not
being an ultrahazardous activity, is an exception to the Dorry general
rule which allows the defense where the activities are innocuous. Thus,
an analysis of a similar case would begin with a determination of
whether the hctivity is classified as "ultrahazardous" or "innocuous."
If the activity is ultrahazardous, contributory negligence will not be
a defense. If, on the other hand, the activity is innocuous, under Dory,
a further inquiry must be made, and where the activity produces in-
come, contributory negligence will not be an allowable defense.
Yet where the activity is neither ultrahazardous nor income pro-
ducing, certain language in Dorry suggests that a further inquiry may
be necessary to determine whether the activity or .conduct was un-
natural to the locality." Thus, a third instance in which contributory
negligence will not be a defense is an otherwise innocuous, non-income
producing activity which is unnatural to the locality. On the other
hand, the Dorry court may have intended to include unnatural ac-
92. Holland v. Buckley. 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
93. Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
94. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
95. The language in the present case is as follows: "As we have interpreted the
Code, strict liability has been found in circumstances or conduct apparently innocuous.
Buckley's pet dog .... Bucher's bicycle riding child .... and Parr's magnolia tree
... were neither ultrahazardous nor unnatural to the locality, and produced no income
to the defendant." 399 So. 2d 561 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted).
It is arguable that because a comma appears after "locality," the income producing
phrase is separated and because there is no comma following "ultrahazardous," the
ultrahazardous and unnatural phrases are read together.
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tivities within the scope of ultrahazardous activities. To include un-
natural activities in Louisiana strict liability law would seem to in-
corporate into our law the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher," which was
probably not the intention of the Louisiana Supreme Court. But
regardless of how unnatural activities are classified, the defense will
not be available to defendants engaged in such activities.
Inasmuch as Dorry relied on Professor Prosser's term "abnormal
conduct"'" in distinguishing between activities which should or should
not be allowed the defense of contributory negligence, it is submitted
that ultrahazardous and unnatural activities both should be considered
"abnormal conduct" and thus the initial inquiry could be simply
whether the activity was "innocuous" or "abnormal." These points are
at the very least factors to be weighed in a determination which the
Dorry court suggests should be developed on a case by case basis.
If the dictum in Dorry is followed and strictly liable defendants
conducting "innocuous" activities are allowed to assert the defense
of contributory negligence, that contributory negligence may trigger
Louisiana's comparative negligence statute,"8 thus comparatively
diminishing the plaintiffs recovery in proportion to his fault, rather
than completely barring plaintiffs recovery." The supreme court stated
that had contributory negligence been a defense in the instant case,
"dismissal" would have been appropriate, ® and it consistently dis-
cussed the contributory negligence defense as a "bar."'' However,
the facts in the instant case occurred before the effective date of Loui-
siana's comparative negligence statute;1'2 therefore, comparative
negligence was not an issue.
Before recovery may be comparatively diminished, article 2323
96. This writer has found no indication that Louisiana courts have held defen-
dants strictly liable for conducting unnatural activities. Consistently, Louisiana courts
have not relied on the common law basis of strict liability expressed in Rylands v.
Fletcher. The Dorry court's inclusion of the word "unnatural" seems to be inadvertent
and unintended dictum.
97. Dorry cited W. PROSSER, supra note 21, at S 79, at 522. See 399 So. 2d at 600-01.
98. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2322 provides:
When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages, its effect shall
be as follows: If a person suffers injury, death or loss as the result partly of
his own negligence and partly of the fault of another person or persons, the claim
for damages shall not thereby be defeated, but the amount of damages recoverable
shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence at-
tributable to the person suffering the injury, or death or loss.
99. See generally Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REV.
289 (1980).
100. 399 So. 2d at 560.
101. Id. at 561, 563.
102. 1979 La. Acts. No. 431 (effective August 1, 1980).
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requires that 1) contributory negligence be applicable, and 2) the in-
jury be the result of both negligence on the part of the injured party
and fault of another person. If Dorry is followed, then the defense
of contributory negligence will be applicable. The second requirement
seems to be met as well, particularly since the article does not re-
quire "negligence" on the part of both parties, but merely "negligence"
on the part of the injured party and "fault" of another person. The
language is clear and does not appear to be limited to actions based
on negligence.
The language in Loescher and its progeny point to a bar of the
plaintiff's recovery; however, the opinion of Justice Tate (now Judge
Tate) in Loescher preceded by nearly four years the legislative reenact-
ment of article 2323 to provide for comparative negligence.' Arguably
because contributory negligence was not a defense to strict liability
actions at the time article 2323 was enacted, the legislature did not
intend that comparative negligence apply to strict liability actions.
But inasmuch as the article does not limit itself to negligence cases,
the phrase "where contributory negligence is applicable" should be
read broadly to include strict liability cases "where contributory
negligence is applicable." Rodrigue v. Dixilyn Corp.10' held that con-
tributory negligence was not a defense to strict liability actions; never-
theless, Judge Tate limited the discussion of recovery to "pre-
comparative Louisiana negligence law."10" Therefore it is not
unreasonable to suggest that the comparative negligence statute
should be interpreted to apply to strict liability actions.'" It has been
noted that the statute "does not purport to designate the classes of
actions in which contributory negligence is applicable; that is left to
the courts."'0 7 However, this may be a proper area for legislative
clarification.
103. Loescher v. Parr was decided December 8, 1975; moreover, the facts occurred
some time prior thereto. The effective date of article 2323 was August 1, 1980.
104. 620 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1980). In Rodrigue, a strict liability action was brought
under Civil Code article 2317 by an injured offshore worker who fell through a hole
in the walkway of a drilling rig. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through
Judge Tate, followed the reasoning of Langlois that the affirmative defense of con-
tributory negligence is properly pleaded only where an action is based on negligence
and that negligence is an ingredient of fault.
105. Id. at 541 (footnote omitted). Moreover, in a footnote, Judge Tate acknowl-
edged an increasingly widespread reconsideration of the rule that contributory
negligence is not a defense to strict liability actions, and he. noted the possibility of
a change in Louisiana law with the adoption of comparative negligence. Id. at 544 n.11.
106. Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 LA. L. REV. 403,
412 (1980). Professor Plant concludes: "There are no conceptual or semantic barriers
to the application of the Louisiana comparative negligence statute in cases involving
strict tort liability." Id..at-415.
107. Id. at 413. See the discussion of comparative fault applied to strict liability
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The denial of contributory negligence as a defense places a very
heavy burden on a strictly liable defendant. Dorry reduces this burden
by allowing the defense in certain cases. However, permitting this
defense to bar completely the plaintiffs recovery would place a very
heavy burden on the plaintiff; thus comparative negligence should be
applied to ease this burden. By diminishing comparatively the plain-
tiff's recovery in proportion to his fault, a more equitable result is
achieved. One scholar, in describing the advantage of the comparative
negligence doctrine, noted that "each misbehaving party gets his come-
uppance, yet everybody wins a teddybear.'""
In the future, another issue may arise from the instant case.
Langlois has been cited for the proposition that contributory
negligence is not a defense in strict liability cases."9 Because Dorrj
purports to limit Langlois, the contributory negligence defense might
well be expanded to products liability actions. If so, comparative
negligence might apply there as well."0
While the distinctions between assumption of risk and contributory
negligence are useful and important in defining the defense of victim
fault, those distinctions serve to cement a necessary foundation to
a more important step in the law. The paramount importance of Dorry
v. LaFleur lies in the recognition by the Louisiana Supreme Court
that the victim fault defense in strict liability actions may include
contributory negligence in certain circumstances. The reasoning behind
the Dorry decision is sound and its policy is strong. Likewise, the
next logical step in the development of strict liability law is the ap.
plication of comparative negligence. In short, Dorry v. LaFleur
represents a needed step back from the cold imposition of strict liabil-
ity in Louisiana, and regardless of any problems which may result.
in its detailed application, the thrust of Dorry propels Louisiana legal
theories of risk allocation and loss distribution in a more equitable
direction.
Ray inond Lloyd Brown, Jr.
in other jurisdictions in Sales, supra note 25 at 759-78 (1980) and Plant, supra note
106, at 404-10.
108. Malone, Prologue (Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Louisiana), 40 LA.
L. REv. 293, 293 (1980).
109. Khoder v. A.M.F., Inc., 539 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1976); Hastings v. Dis Tran
Prod., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. La. 1975). For a discussion of this issue by Judge
Tate, see Rodrigue v. Dixilyn Corp., 620 F.2d 537, 543 (5th Cir. 1980), and text at note
104, supra.
110. It is not within the scope of this article, nor is it the intention of this writer,
to discuss the theory of Louisiana products liability law, but this issue has been recog.
nized by at least one commentator long before the Dorry decision. See Crawford, Pro.-
ducts Liability-The Cause of Action, 22 LA. B.J. 239, 287 (1975).
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